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Abstract 
 
The past decade has seen a gradual global increase in digital authoritarianism. 
Internet shutdowns, online censorship, mass surveillance and violations of privacy rights 
have all become more frequent in parts of the world where citizens are not 
guaranteed sufficient digital rights. The task of defending, promoting and protecting 
internet freedom is becoming increasingly relevant for the European Union (EU) − for 
internal digital and cybersecurity policies as well as for the EU’s external promotion of 
democracy and human rights. Whilst much has been written about the various internal 
policies which establish and protect internet freedom within the European Union and 
its member states, the EU’s external engagement in this field remains critically under-
researched. To what extent does the EU engage externally in the promotion and 
protection of internet freedom? This paper answers this question by covering a wide 
variety of policy fields including human rights and democracy promotion, digital 
policy, enlargement and neighbourhood policy, development cooperation and 
trade policy. Whereas the EU faces a limited opportunity to shape global norms with 
regard to internet freedom or to change the course of digitally authoritarian states, it 
has demonstrated several strengths which deserve not to be overlooked. These 
include, for example, the externalisation of internal data protection and policies and 
the provision of direct support and protection for civil society.  Despite facing 
significant obstacles, the promotion and protection of internet freedom has become 
an important area of the EU’s external action which is only set to become more 
relevant in the coming years.   
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Introduction: technology as a double edged-sword for democracy 
 
“Technology can support human rights, but we must also ensure it is  
not used against those struggling for freedom.”1 – Neelie Kroes, 2011 
 
The link between democracy and internet freedom is at the forefront of discussions 
over internet shutdowns, content regulation, disinformation, cybersecurity, online 
privacy and surveillance. The benefits of the internet as a precious tool for enabling 
transparency and increased democratic participation are widely understood and 
often taken for granted. However, the internet has also been increasingly presented 
as a threat to democracy and even as a tool which can enable forms of “postmodern 
totalitarianism”.2 Global internet freedom has been in decline over the past decade 
and elements of a dystopian future of cyberspace surveillance, control and mani-
pulation somewhat akin to those in Orwell’s ‘1984’ are not far from reality in some of 
the more severe cases of digital authoritarianism.3 In a world with four billion internet 
users where internet penetration is increasing rapidly and 70% of the world’s youth are 
online, issues of internet freedom are only set to become more prevalent in the future.4 
Questions of whether and how controls for various aspects of internet governance 
should be implemented are now issues of growing geopolitical significance. 
 
The task of defending, promoting and protecting internet freedom is becoming 
increasingly relevant in EU internal digital and cybersecurity policies as well as in the 
external promotion of democracy and human rights. Whilst much has been written 
about the various internal policies which establish and protect internet freedom within 
the European Union (EU) and its member states, the EU’s external engagement in the 
promotion and protection of internet freedom remains critically under-researched.5 
This paper will answer the question: to what extent does the EU engage externally in 
the promotion and protection of internet freedom. The paper argues that although 
the EU faces a limited opportunity to shape global norms with regard to internet 
                                                 
1 Cited in: European Commission, “Digital Agenda: Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg invited by Kroes 
to promote internet freedom globally”, Press Release, Brussels, 12 December 2011.  
2 L. Diamond, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: The Threat of Postmodern Totalitarianism”, 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 30, no. 1, 2019, p. 20. 
3 Ibid., p. 21; Freedom House, Freedom on The Net 2018, Washington, D.C., 2018, p. 4.  
4 Youth is defined as people aged 15-24 years. See: B. Sanou, “ICT Facts and Figures 2017”, 
International Telecommunication Union, Geneva, 2017, p. 1.  
5 At the time of writing, the only published research on the topic appears to be a 2013 report 
discussing the EU’s role in promoting freedom of expression online. See: B. Pellot, “Index policy 
paper: Is the EU heading in the right direction on digital freedom?”, Index on Censorship, 20 
June 2013.  
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freedom or to change the course of digitally authoritarian states, it has demonstrated 
several strengths which deserve not to be overlooked. These include, for example, the 
externalisation of internal data protection and policies and the provision of direct 
support and protection for civil society. 
 
The findings in this paper are based upon a combination of document- and interview-
based research.6 As well as making use of the relevant academic literature and 
publicly available EU policy documents, a series of semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with representatives from the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT), the 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) 
and from the European Endowment for Democracy (EED).   
 
My research design purposefully encompasses many different areas of EU external 
engagement in an attempt to build a complete picture of EU external engagement 
in the field of the promotion and protection of internet freedom. It is therefore not 
within the scope of this work to take consideration of the individual and specific 
country contexts of EU external action. However, as the EU’s engagement in this policy 
area continues to expand, this paper can serve as a useful point of reference for 
further research that could take a more specific country or regional focus. The 
research could also serve as a basis for further studies aiming to assess the impact of 
various elements of the EU’s external engagement in this field.   
 
After defining what is meant by the term ‘internet freedom’, the paper will discuss the 
value of the internet as a tool for strengthening democracy. Based upon this 
discussion, the following sections will look at the global institutional setting and global 
norm cleavages as well as the internal legal and policy frameworks for EU 
engagement in the promotion and protection of internet freedom.  The EU’s external 
engagement in this domain will then be analysed, looking into the policy fields of 
human rights and democracy promotion, digital policy, enlargement and 
neighbourhood policy, development cooperation and trade policy. This will offer 
                                                 
6 For more details see: S. Garside, Democracy and Digital Authoritarianism: An Assessment of 
the EU’s External Engagement in the Promotion and Protection of Internet Freedom, Master’s 
thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2019.  
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insights into the challenges faced as well as the identification of opportunities for 
further development of the EU’s current approach.   
 
What is meant by ‘internet freedom’? 
 
The term ‘internet freedom’ encompasses a broad range of interrelated human rights, 
often referred to as ‘digital rights’. These include the rights to internet access, online 
freedom of expression, digital privacy and the right to seek, receive and impart 
information online.7 The question of whether internet access should itself be 
considered a human right has attracted considerable attention. Whilst many have 
argued that it does indeed constitute a human right, others rather see it as a tool which 
can be used to enable other rights.8 Regardless of which perspective is taken on the 
issue, the United Nations (UN) has clearly condemned any attempt to intentionally 
prevent or disrupt access to the internet and has stressed the need for human rights to 
underpin internet governance, stating that the rights people have offline must also be 
protected online.9   
 
The rights to internet access, online freedom of expression, digital privacy and the right 
to seek, receive and impart information online are broadly encompassed within the 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Under Article 19, individuals are 
entitled to freedom of opinion and expression, including the right to receive and 
impart information and ideas “through any media and regardless of frontiers”, and 
Article 12 states that no individual shall be “subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation”.10  
 
As is conceived by Freedom House in their annual “Freedom on the Net” report, digital 
rights can be organised into three distinct categories: ‘obstacles to access’, ‘limits on 
content’ and ‘violations of user rights’.11 Obstacles to access includes infrastructural 
limitations and economic barriers to access, as well as government efforts to block or 
                                                 
7 J. Kurbalija, An Introduction to Internet Governance, DiploFoundation, Msida, 7th edn., 2016, 
p. 207. 
8 V.G. Cerf, “Internet Access Is Not A Human Right”, The New York Times, 4 January 2012.  
9 United Nations, General Assembly, “The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights 
on the Internet”, Resolution 32/13, 1 July 2016.  
10 United Nations, General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A 
(III), Paris, 1948.  
11 Freedom House, Freedom on The Net 2018, Washington, D.C., 2018, p. 24.  
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limit access.12 Limits on content refer to forms of censorship and content manipulation, 
including the filtering and blocking of websites. This category also considers the 
diversity of online news media and the usage of digital media for purposes of social 
and political activism.13 Violations of user rights include restrictions on online activity, 
questions of privacy, anonymity and surveillance as well as repercussions for online 
activity, such as legal prosecution, imprisonment, physical attacks or other forms of 
harassment.14   
 
These three elements of internet freedom can be seen as interdependent: obstacles 
to access and limits on content both dictate the value of freedom expression online, 
and freedom expression online itself depends on assurances of privacy and freedom 
from unwarranted surveillance. It is thus the combination of the three categories of 
‘obstacles to access’, ‘limits on content’ and ‘violations of user rights’ which will 
underpin the understanding of internet freedom to be used in this paper.  
 
The internet: a tool for strengthening democracy?  
 
In the information age of the 21st century, discussions about democracy and media 
freedom can hardly be detached from issues of internet freedom and digital rights. 
Although it is clear that ICT is not in itself a solution for democracy, internet access does 
have important benefits to offer. In the academic debate, so-called ‘cyber-
enthusiasts’ or ‘techno-optimists’ have highlighted the benefits of internet access as a 
tool for facilitating freedom of expression, lowering the costs of obtaining information, 
organising and contributing to collective action.15 Additionally, internet-based 
platforms present opportunities for increased transparency and accountability as well 
as opening the possibility for increased participation or even new forms of voting 
systems.16 For example, the concept of ‘e-democracy’, which is primarily based on 
models of participatory and deliberative democracy, refers to the use of online 
                                                 
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid.  
15 H. Margetts, “The Internet and Democracy”, in W. Dutton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Internet Studies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 1. 
16 In Europe, recent years have seen populist movements – in particular Italy’s Five Star 
Movement and Spain’s Podemos – make first attempts at creating digital platforms to 
capitalise on the attraction of direct democratic involvement. See: F. Berti, “E-Politics for ‘the 
people’? The case studies of Rousseau and Podemos”, The Good Lobby, 27 September 2017. 
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platforms to support and enhance democratic functions.17 In a more general sense, it 
can also be argued that by enabling access to information and education, 
contributing to greater socio-economic equality or empowering women within 
communities, internet access also benefits democracy in more indirect ways. 
 
However, in the context of a global trend of declining internet freedom, it is important 
to recognise that any benefits associated with the use of the internet as a tool for 
increased transparency, citizen engagement or activism remain conditional upon the 
insurance of sufficient internet freedom and digital rights. Worldwide, the adoption of 
cybersecurity measures has frequently been accompanied by deteriorations in 
internet freedom and the growing trend of disrespect for digital rights has even led 
some ‘cyber-sceptics’ and ‘techno-pessimists’ to argue that the internet now poses 
“a major threat to democratic stability and human freedom”.18    
 
Internet shutdowns, which can be understood as obstacles to access caused by 
“intentional disruption of internet or cellphone networks in response to political or social 
events”, have become a more prevalent global phenomenon.19 Data collected and 
published by the advocacy group Access Now shows that the number of global 
shutdowns increased from 75 in 2016 to 188 in 2018 – with India listed as the worst 
offender.20 Apart from the huge economic cost of internet shutdowns, blocking 
access to the internet restricts digital rights and can be seen as a form of 
antidemocratic government control which limits both access to information and 
freedom of expression. 
 
Limitations on freedom of expression can also be seen where various governments 
have chosen to place limits on content by selectively restricting access, blocking 
certain internet sites and communication applications. Restrictions to social media 
access on election days has become common practice in many countries across 
Africa and several countries including China, Russia, Turkey and Iran have chosen to 
impose permanent bans on certain social media sites (such as Facebook, Twitter and 
                                                 
17 European Parliamentary Research Service, “Prospects for e-democracy in Europe: Study 
Summary”, Brussels, February 2018, p. 7.  
18 Diamond, op. cit., p. 20.  
19 Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net Methodology”.  
20 Access Now, “Internet Shutdowns in Context: Insights from the Shutdown Tracker Optimization 
Project (STOP)”, 13 December 2018; Raw data obtained from Access Now, op. cit.  
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YouTube) or secure messaging services which allow users to send encrypted messages 
(such as Telegram, WhatsApp and Signal).21 In Uganda, the so-called ‘over-the-top’ 
social media tax has been criticised for limiting access for over 2.5 million users.22 Whilst 
some users manage to circumvent blocks using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), 
governments – albeit some quicker than others – have begun to acquire VPN blocking 
technology and implement laws which render the use of VPNs illegal.23 
 
When it comes to violations of user rights, China is often used to illustrate some of the 
world’s most extreme cases of censorship and digital rights violations.24 The Chinese 
government operates the world’s most advanced apparatus for internet censorship, 
known as the ‘Great Firewall’, which not only blocks access to tens of thousands of 
sites and domain names, but also enables automated and systematic internet 
censorship of content criticising the regime. 25 China has begun to assert its dominance 
in cyberspace through new measures to implement what can best be described as a 
“surveillance state”.26 A new cybersecurity law introduced in June 2017 compromises 
user anonymity by strengthening the existing obligation of internet companies to 
register users under their real names.27 Limits on VPNs which help internet users to 
conceal their identity, location or nature of their activity are in place and Chinese 
companies are legally obliged to co-operate with the government in safeguarding 
national security.28 This gives the Chinese government the ability to access large 
amounts of data, which is an essential element of the state’s surveillance strategy. The 
forthcoming nationwide Social Credit System (SCS), which is due to be fully 
implemented by 2020, will encompass vast amounts of data tracking citizens’ in-
person and online behaviour.29 Despite the fact that studies have shown high 
approval levels for the system amongst the Chinese public, with many considering the 
                                                 
21 T. Freyburg & L. Gabre, “Blocking the Bottleneck: Internet Shutdowns and Ownership at 
Election Times in Sub-Saharan Africa”, International Journal of Communication, vol. 12, 2018, 
pp. 3896-3916.  
22 R. Ratcliffe & S. Okiror, “Milions of Ugandans quit internet services as social media tax takes 
effect”, The Guardian, 27 February 2019.  
23 A. O’Driscoll, “Where are VPNs legal and where are they banned?”, Comparitech, 13 
November 2017.  
24 Freedom House, Freedom on The Net 2018, op. cit., p. 1. 
25 Freedom House, “China Country Report: Freedom on the Net 2018”, 2018. 
26 X. Qiang, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi’s Surveillance State”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 30, no. 1, 2019, pp. 53-67.  
27 Freedom House, “China Country Report: Freedom on the Net 2018”, op. cit. 
28 Ibid. 
29 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Planning Outline for the Construction of a 
Social Credit System (2014-2020), trans. R. Creemers, 14 June 2014.  
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rewards that high credit scores can offer, defenders of internet freedom have well-
founded fears that the SCS will only reinforce and further substantiate limits to freedom 
of expression.30 Considering that arrests and imprisonments of online activists already 
occur regularly in China, the SCS is likely to further limit citizens’ abilities to express 
themselves freely online.31   
 
Whilst obstacles to access and internet censorship create immediate challenges to 
media freedom and democracy, violations of user rights, including legal action and 
imprisonment of online journalists and activists, have created a double cause for 
concern – on the one hand, for the immediate rights of the affected individuals, and 
on the other, for the deterrent this causes for other citizens who no longer consider 
using the internet as a platform for exercising their right to freedom of expression.    
 
Although the lowest ranking in the Freedom House internet freedom ranking are almost 
exclusively illiberal regimes, limitations to internet freedom are certainly not unique to 
these countries.32 Questions of internet freedom have increasingly reached headline 
news within liberal democracies, with most attention granted to issues of data privacy, 
cybersecurity and surveillance. Perhaps the most shocking revelation of breaches of 
internet freedom made in the context of any liberal democracy were those made by 
Edward Snowden in 2013 about the mass surveillance programmes of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) of the United States (US).33 Snowden revealed that the NSA was 
able to tap directly into the servers of nine internet firms, including Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft and Yahoo, in order to track online communications.34 This scandal 
demonstrated that the failure to balance security concerns and internet freedom was 
not only an issue in digitally authoritarian states. Snowden’s revelations about violations 
of privacy committed by the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) showed that even within the EU, sufficient surveillance safeguards cannot 
always be counted on.35 
 
                                                 
30 G. Kostka, “China’s Social Credit Systems and Public Opinion: Explaining High Levels of 
Approval”, New Media & Society, vol. 21, no. 7, 2019, pp. 1565-1593. 
31 Freedom House, “China Country Report: Freedom on the Net 2018”, op. cit. 
32 Freedom House, Freedom on The Net 2018, op. cit., p. 25.  
33 BBC News, “Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme”, 17 January 2014.  
34 Ibid.  
35 O. Bowcott, “GCHQ data collection regime violated human rights, court rules”, The 
Guardian, 13 September 2018.  
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In 2018, the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal brought considerable attention 
to the link between data privacy and democracy. The scandal which has since been 
described as “a lesson in institutional failure” revealed that the UK-based political 
consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica, had harvested personal data from millions of 
Facebook users without their consent and used the data to create targeted, 
politically-motivated communications and advertising strategies.36 The data was used 
to support clients including Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and the Leave EU 
campaign in the UK.37 The idea that the internet could be used as a communication 
tool for election campaigning is not a new one, but the revelations were the first to 
show the extent to which violations of internet users’ data privacy can have damaging 
effects on democracy.   
 
Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election which occurred “in sweeping 
and systematic fashion” drew further attention to the damage that the internet can 
cause to democracy.38 As well as hacking computer networks belonging to Hilary 
Clinton’s campaign team, social media campaigns implemented the use of ‘troll 
farms’ − vast teams of operatives who create fake social media accounts in order to 
support particular opinions or spread disinformation and distrust.39 Subsequent 
elections have been plagued with concerns regarding online disinformation and 
election-hacking.  
 
The following section addresses the global institutional setting for internet governance 
as well as the global norm cleavages related to internet freedom. This will enable a 
better understanding of the EU’s opportunity for external engagement in the 
promotion and protection of internet freedom.40 
 
  
                                                 
36 C. Cadwalladr, “Cambridge Analytica a year on: ‘a lesson in institutional failure’”, The 
Guardian, 17 March 2019. 
37 Ibid. 
38 U.S. Department of Justice, “Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In the 2016 
Presidential Election”, Washington, D.C., vol. 1, March 2018, p. 1.  
39 D. Lee, “The tactics of a Russian troll farm”, BBC News, 16 February 2018.  
40 This understanding of opportunity draws on C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as 
a Global Actor, Abingdon, Routledge, 2006, 2nd edn, pp. 24-27.  
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Limited opportunity: challenges for the EU in a fragmented global setting 
 
Whilst it is clear that the information age has brought with it numerous complex 
transboundary problems, internet governance remains characterised by a 
fragmented global institutional setting which is multi-stakeholder in nature.41 Internet 
governance encompasses a whole host of issues including Domain Name Systems 
(DNSs), accessibility, privacy, surveillance, intellectual property rights and cyber-
security. Besides issues related to DNSs, which are managed through the non-profit, 
California-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
issues of internet governance are primarily addressed under the UN-convened Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF). The IGF brings together various stakeholder groups – 
including governments, private sector firms, civil society groups, members of the 
technical and academic community − in order to facilitate policy dialogue on issues 
of internet governance as equals.42 Although it facilitates exchange of best practice 
and offers a possibility for raising pressing issues related to internet governance, the IGF 
has been criticised for being a “mere talking shop”.43 It remains a weak, but none-
theless important, international institution which serves as a forum for discussion, both 
reflecting and shaping the global norms and values surrounding internet freedom.  
 
The EU attends the annual IGF conferences and is actively involved in the forum but 
does not have the same opportunity to exert influence in other international internet 
governance organisations. The Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) − an organisation 
made up of a set of thirty governments committed to supporting internet freedom and 
protecting human rights − is a state-based organisation which does not offer 
membership to regional organisations. 44 Fourteen of its thirty members, however, are 
EU member states.45 In the case of the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a multi-
stakeholder platform created to specifically address issues of internet censorship and 
online privacy by supporting companies in developing self-regulatory approaches, 
neither states nor regional organisations are invited to apply for membership.46  
                                                 
41 L. Dendaris, The Global War for Internet Governance, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2014, 
p. 226.  
42 Internet Governance Forum, “About the IGF”, n.d.  
43 C.M. Glen, Controlling Cyberspace: The Politics of Internet Governance and Regulation, 
Santa Barbara, CA, Praeger, 2018, p. 38.  
44 Freedom Online Coalition, “Freedom Online: Joint Action for Free Expression on the Internet 
[Founding Declaration]”, 15 December 2011.  
45 Freedom Online Coalition, “About Us: Members”, n.d.  
46 Global Network Initiative, “About”, n.d.  
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In the field of cybersecurity, all EU member states are signatories to the Council of 
Europe’s Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.47 The convention, which came into 
force in July 2004, covers inter alia the topic of violations of network security.48 With 66 
signatories, the international convention is a legally binding international instrument 
which establishes common domestic criminal legislation on cybercrime and fosters 
international co-operation.49 However, the convention is limited by the fact that 
important global players such as Russia and China have not agreed to sign up. 
Furthermore, many of the existing signatories have recently expressed a need for the 
contents of the convention to be strengthened.50 
 
Alongside the structural context of internet and cybersecurity governance, it is also 
important to consider the global norms and institutions in place for governing the trade 
of surveillance technologies. ICT surveillance technologies are classified as ‘dual-use’ 
items, that is to say items which can be used for both civilian and military purposes. 
Examples include ‘spyware’ such as devices for mobile telecommunications 
interception, jamming equipment, Internet Protocol (IP) network surveillance systems 
and intrusion software.51 These technologies have been covered under the Wassenaar 
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
technologies since December 2013.52 The Wassenaar Arrangement promotes trans-
parency and greater responsibility in transfers of dual-use goods and technologies. 53 
Agreed guiding principles are implemented via national legislation and signatory 
states engage in established processes of information sharing.54 The Arrangement 
currently has 42 participating states including Russia and the US and − with the 
exception of Cyprus (whose membership was blocked by Turkey) − all EU member 
states are signatories. Aside from the fact that the Wassenaar Arrangement is not an 
international treaty and is therefore not legally binding, the scope of the Arrangement 
                                                 
47 Council of Europe, “Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)5 of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on Internet freedom”, 13 April 2016; Council of Europe, “Convention on 
Cybercrime”, Budapest, 23 November 2001.  
48 Council of Europe, “Convention on Cybercrime”, op. cit.  
49 Council of Europe Treaty Office, “Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 185: 
Convention on Cybercrime”, n.d. 
50 Implied within the Paris Call, see: France Diplomatie, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, 
“Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace”, 11 December 2018.  
51 M. Bromley et al., “ICT Surveillance Systems: Trade Policy and the Application of Human 
Security Concerns”, Strategic Trade Review, vol. 2, no. 2, 2016, p. 38. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Wassenaar Arrangement, “About Us”, n.d.  
54 Ibid.  
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is limited by its focus on concerns of international security and stability which often 
trump human rights concerns.55 Furthermore, China, which has a booming export 
industry for ICT surveillance technologies and Artificial Intelligence (AI), is not a 
signatory.56 
 
Above and beyond the institutional settings for issues related to internet freedom, 
perhaps the most significant constraining factor in the EU’s external environment is the 
global norm cleavage related to internet freedom – in particular regarding issues of 
privacy. Although under Article 12 of the UDHR the right to privacy is understood to be 
a universal right, it is clear that the right to privacy is not respected or interpreted in the 
same way across the globe. Digitally authoritarian states with low internet freedom 
ratings, such as China and Russia, have defended the concept of ‘internet 
sovereignty’ which favours strong national controls over the internet, opposing the EU 
and US view of an open and multi-stakeholder approach to internet governance. With 
China beginning to promote its model of cybersecurity to governments in South-East 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, the universality of the right to privacy is endangered 
and the split in understandings over models for internet governance has created a 
challenging environment for promoting values of internet freedom.57 
 
In summary, it can be seen that the global institutional setting is very fragmented, with 
various organisations and institutions attempting to address a wide range of different 
topics. The existing multi-stakeholder approach – which is the approach favoured by 
the EU − purposefully rejects a strong, single regulatory body who could ‘control the 
internet’. When it comes to cybersecurity and export controls for surveillance 
technologies, the overarching structures for international co-operation suffer from 
numerous limitations arising from both the scope of issues addressed and their lack of 
universal application. The deepening ideological split between those moving towards 
forms of digital authoritarianism and those favouring an open and free internet leaves 
very little opportunity for the EU to transform the nature of the global structural context. 
The following section will analyse the internal context of EU action, taking into account 
                                                 
55 Bromley et al. argue that adding technologies to the Wassenaar Arrangement on purely 
human rights grounds would likely be opposed. See: Bromley et al., op. cit., p. 45.  
56 S.N. Romaniuk & T. Burgers, “How China’s AI Technology Exports Are Seeding Surveillance 
Societies Globally”, The Diplomat, 18 October 2018; Wassenaar Arrangement, op. cit. 
57 Freedom House reports on training seminars run by Chinese officials and suggests that various 
new cybersecurity and cybercrime laws have been modelled on those of China. See: Freedom 
House, Freedom on The Net 2018, op. cit., p. 8.  
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the legal and policy frameworks surrounding EU policy-making in the promotion and 
protection of internet freedom.  
 
Understanding the internal context of EU external action  
 
The topic of internet freedom is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. However, building upon several articles which express 
the EU’s legal commitment to upholding values of human dignity, democracy and 
respect for human rights, the topic has greater prominence in EU policy documents 
over time.58 An explicit commitment to promoting and protecting internet freedom 
was presented in the 2012 Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy. 59 This was further developed in the 2015 Action Plan on Human Rights on 
Democracy and, most notably, in the 2014 EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom 
of Expression Online and Offline (hereinafter referred to as the Guidelines).60 
 
Although their title may suggest an explicit focus on freedom of expression, the 
Guidelines in fact form the basis for much of the EU’s external engagement in the 
promotion and protection of internet freedom, addressing a range of topics including 
privacy, surveillance and even public diplomacy.61 Despite not being legally binding 
in character, the Guidelines present an important point of reference for officials from 
the and its member states, for example during the delivery of technical assistance or 
in discussions of conditionality in human rights dialogues with third countries. The priority 
action areas covered by the Guidelines span many policy domains, including human 
rights and democracy promotion, digital policy, enlargement and neighbour-hood 
policy, international development and trade policy.62 This means that policy-making 
processes related to the promotion and protection of internet freedom rely on the co-
operation of multiple actors, decision-making procedures and funding mechanisms.   
 
                                                 
58 See Articles 2, 6, 21, 49 TEU and articles 7, 8,10, 11, 22 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in: European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union of 13 December 2007”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C326, 16 October 2012. 
59 Council of the European Union, “EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights 
and Democracy”, Luxembourg, 25 June 2012. 
60 Council of the European Union, “EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy”, Brussels, 
20 July 2015; Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of 
Expression Online and Offline”, Brussels, 12 May 2014.   
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid. 
Susanna Garside 
16 
In the field of digital policy and in the trade of dual-use technologies, the EU has − in 
accordance with the legal principles of subsidiarity and proportionality − gained some 
level of legal competence to create binding legislation. In development cooperation, 
which is a shared competence of the EU and its member states, the EU has the ability 
to use funding mechanisms such as the Development Corporation Instrument (DCI) to 
develop initiatives which support the development of digital infrastructure. In the field 
of human rights and democracy promotion, the EU has a dedicated funding 
instrument, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), from 
which considerable funds are dedicated to internet freedom-related projects. For the 
candidate countries and the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
funding to support online freedom of expression and media plurality is delivered 
through the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) and the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI). Further to this, the EU supports the work of the European Endowment 
for Democracy, a specialised agency which was established in 2013 to provide civil 
society support, primarily to neighbourhood countries.  
 
One factor that has positively influenced the EU’s agenda with regard to the 
promotion of internet freedom is the agenda-setting role of the European Parliament. 
Led by Marietje Schaake, a Dutch member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats 
for Europe Party (ALDE), the European Parliament has put forward a progressive 
agenda for the promotion of internet freedom. In 2012 it adopted a resolution on a 
Digital Freedom Strategy for EU Foreign Policy.63 Elements of this strategy undoubtedly 
influenced the drafting of the 2014 Guidelines and are reflected in areas of the EU’s 
external engagement discussed in the following sections.   
 
However, despite the fact that the work of the European Parliament has been able to 
shape and influence the EU policies related to issues of internet freedom, its role faces 
limitations – particularly in the case of policy areas such as export controls for 
surveillance technologies, which are sensitive policy areas for member states. Despite 
the fact that the EU has competence to make and shape policies to promote and 
protect internet freedom in many different policy domains, the complex policy-
making processes which require the consensus of a number of actors increase the risk 
                                                 
63 European Parliament, “Resolution of 11 December 2012 on a Digital Freedom Strategy in EU 
Foreign Policy (2012/2094(INI))”, Official Journal of the European Union, C 434/21, 23 December 
2015.  
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of policy incoherence both horizontally (between EU policy areas) and vertically 
(between policies at member state and EU level).  
 
The following sections will delve into the various aspects of the EU’s external 
engagement in the promotion and protection of internet freedom. This will first entail 
a look at external engagement resulting from internal policies, before moving on to 
explore EU external policies aimed at promoting and protecting internet freedom. The 
subsequent section will assess the extent to which the EU is able to overcome the 
challenges posed by its fairly limited opportunity for shaping global internet 
governance.   
 
EU external engagement based on internal policies  
 
As a result of the EU’s strategy for a Digital Single Market which was launched in 2015, 
there has been an increase in EU legislation related to internet freedom. For example, 
a 2015 regulation set the basis for the abolishment of EU roaming charges and created 
an EU-wide legal guarantee for net neutrality.64 This means that internet service 
providers (ISPs) should treat all internet communications equally and not discriminate, 
for example, by giving faster or lower-cost access to certain sites.65 This is an important 
part of ensuring internet freedom since it guarantees that ISPs do not gain a role in 
imposing limitations on content. The EU’s approach to net neutrality has not been 
without criticism, but in a global context where the US has chosen to repeal its net 
neutrality laws, the EU (alongside India), has some of the world’s most advanced 
requirements.66 
 
From an international perspective, perhaps the most impactful internet freedom 
legislation developed at EU level has been on the protection of user rights. This section 
will first discuss the external impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
                                                 
64 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, “Regulation of 25 November 
2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access and amending Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services and Regulation (EU) No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile 
communications networks within the Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 310/1, 26 
November 2015. 
65 Ibid.  
66 For an evaluation of the EU’s net neutrality see: Epicenter.works, The Net Neutrality Situation 
in the EU: Evaluation of the First Two Years of Enforcement, 29 January 2019. See also: BBC News, 
“US officially repeals net neutrality”, 11 June 2018; BBC News, “India adopts ‘world’s strongest’ 
net neutrality norms”, 12 July 2018.  
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and forthcoming ePrivacy Regulation before moving on to discuss the externalisation 
of EU internal policies in candidate countries for EU accession. This analysis will take 
into account the ability of the EU “by virtue of its existence, to exert influence beyond 
its borders”.67 This concerns the EU’s structural power, combining understandings 
about the fundamental nature or identity of the Union with the (often unintended) 
consequences of EU policies.68   
 
Beyond borders: GDPR and the forthcoming ePrivacy Regulation 
 
The EU has an  accumulation of internal legal and policy acquis which has been 
introduced in order to enshrine Article 8 of the European Charter of Human Rights 
concerning the protection of personal data and Article 7 concerning the respect for 
private and family life, home and communications.69 The 2002 ePrivacy Directive, the 
landmark 2014 European Court of Justice decision on the Right to be Forgotten,70 the 
GDPR, which came into effect in May 2018, and the ePrivacy Regulation proposed in 
2017 have all contributed significantly to the international debate on internet 
privacy.71 Building on the 1995 Data Protection Directive, the GDPR introduced a data 
governance framework which consists of common requirements pertaining to the 
processing of personal data of individuals inside the EU.72 Although also not without its 
criticism, the GDPR has been heralded as “one of the most ambitious attempts to 
regulate data collection in the 21st century”.73 One of the most remarkable elements 
of the GDPR is its external implications − the onus to comply lies on any company which 
processes data of individuals within the EU, meaning that even companies based 
outside the EU could face repercussions for violations of the regulation.74 The forth-
coming ePrivacy Regulation, which is due to replace the 2002 ePrivacy Directive to 
                                                 
67 Bretherton & Vogler, op. cit., p. 24. 
68 Ibid.  
69 European Union, “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”, op. cit.  
70 The case established that citizens have the right to request information to be removed if it 
appears to be “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant”.  See: Case C-131/12, Google 
Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonazález, 
2012.  
71 K. Komaitis, “GDPR: Going Beyond Borders”, Internet Society, 25 May 2018. 
72 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, “Regulation of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 96/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation)”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 119/1, 4 May 2016. 
73 Freedom House, Freedom on The Net 2018, op. cit., p. 18.  
74 C.J. Hoofnagle, B. van der Sloot & F. Zuiderveen Borgesius, “The European Union general data 
protection regulation: what it is and what it means”, Information & Communications 
Technology Law, 2019, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 73-74, 93. 
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include new privacy rules for all electronic communications, will also apply to any firm 
that manages online communications in the EU.75  
 
Despite concerns raised by digital rights activists and internet freedom advocacy 
groups within the EU about loopholes in the GDPR, its entry into force led to a 
widespread belief that the EU was setting itself up as the ‘leading voice’ on internet 
privacy globally.76 The Regulation’s objectives are “internal rather than explicitly 
external”, yet we see a ‘spill-over’ of EU internal legislation whereby the EU’s external 
interlocutors are compelled to engage with the EU as a result of its strong presence.77   
 
With the possibility of fines as high as 4% of global annual turnover, companies have 
high incentives to comply with the GDPR.78 When faced with the decision of whether 
to raise their data privacy standards exclusively for users within the EU or whether to 
expand these standards to all users, some companies have voluntarily opted to apply 
the GDPR globally. 79 For global companies, including very large ones like Microsoft, 
alignment of privacy regulation at a global level has been hugely desirable in order 
to keep costs down.80 The GDPR has also sparked a global discussion about data 
privacy legislation and has even managed to have an influence on legislation in other 
countries. Cases can be observed where states have introduced laws which closely 
resemble the GDPR. For example, the influence of the GDPR on Brazil’s General Data 
Protection Law (GDPL) is unmistakeable.81 Looking beyond the similarity in the name, 
many elements of the Brazilian GDPL closely resemble the EU’s regulation.82 Although 
it has been described as a ‘watered down’ GDPR, a resemblance to the EU Regulation 
can also be seen in the case of California’s Consumer Privacy Act.83 A pattern of 
influence reaching beyond the borders of the EU has also been predicted for the EU’s 
upcoming ePrivacy regulation, which could also apply to firms outside of Europe.84   
 
                                                 
75 J. Apostle, “We survived GDPR, now another EU privacy law looms”, Financial Times, 13 June 
2018.  
76 Komaitis, “GDPR: Going Beyond Borders”, op. cit.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Hoofnagle, van der Sloot & Zuiderveen Borgesius, op. cit., p. 93. 
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own data”, Microsoft Blogs, 21 May 2018. 
80 Ibid. 
81 M. Baxter, “How GDPR is shaping global data protection”, GDPR Report, 24 August 2018. 
82 Ibid. 
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The size and importance of the EU’s internal market leads external actors to adopt 
standards and procedures which resemble those of the EU.85 In the case of the EU’s 
GDPR, and as is also expected to be the case with the forthcoming ePrivacy 
regulation, firms are attracted to the size and value of the EU’s internet user base. 
Although its global share is set to decline in coming years, the EU still represents a 
relatively large proportion of the world’s internet users: whilst accounting for only 6.6% 
percent of the world’s population, the EU hosts over 10% of the world’s internet users.86 
Over half of the EU’s member states have reached an internet penetration rate of 
above 90%, with these users enjoying some of the highest standards of internet 
freedom worldwide.87 For international companies which handle data of EU citizens, 
the choice to stop providing services to the EU’s relatively wealthy internet users is not 
one that companies are prepared to make.88 This leaves the EU with a substantial 
opportunity to shape global norms according to its internal data privacy regulations.  
 
Externalisation of EU internal policy: candidate countries for EU accession 
 
The externalisation of EU internal policy refers to the extension of EU rules beyond its 
borders.89 The EU makes use of conditionality based on the eventual prospect of EU 
membership in order to extend its values and norms relating to internet freedom, 
freedom of expression and media pluralism beyond its borders to candidate countries. 
Freedom of expression and media pluralism requirements are covered “in their 
entirety” under the Copenhagen criteria which lay out the conditions to be fulfilled by 
candidate countries in order to qualify for EU accession.90 Furthermore, the 
requirement to adopt the EU’s entire acquis communautaire includes the EU’s 
regulatory standards covering telecommunications networks and the associated 
digital rights. The EU supports the accession process by providing legal assistance and 
guidance in drafting legislation, by monitoring the policies of candidate countries and 
by providing financial support through the IPA.91   
                                                 
85 Ibid.  
86 Internet World Stats, “Internet Usage in the European Union”, n.d. 
87 All EU countries featuring in the Freedom House 2018 ‘Freedom on the Net’ report all classed 
as “free” See: Freedom House, Freedom on The Net 2018, op. cit., p. 16. 
88 Internet World Stats, op. cit.  
89 C. Damro, S. Gstöhl & S. Schunz, “Analytical framework: Understanding and explaining EU 
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External Engagement, Abingdon, Routledge, 2018, p. 19.  
90 Council of the European Union, “EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression 
Online and Offline”, op. cit., p. 12.  
91 European Commission Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
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External policies promoting and protecting internet freedom 
 
This section addresses the integration of new objectives into existing EU external 
policies (often referred to as mainstreaming), as well as the EU’s attempts to develop 
a more advanced form of sectoral diplomacy in the promotion of internet freedom.92  
 
Bridging the digital divide: promoting internet access worldwide 
 
The EU has been active in the promotion of digital technologies in its development 
policies for over 20 years.93 Over the course of the last decade, around €350 million 
has been devoted to digital initiatives.94 Approximately a third of these funds have 
been allocated through the ENI, with the rest allocated to Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, primarily through the Development Corporation Instrument (DCI).95 The EU 
has acknowledged and addressed digital divides, taking into account the gender 
divide as well as the rural-urban one.96 The strategy of mainstreaming digital 
technologies into development polices is exemplified within DG DEVCO’s current 
‘Digital4Development’ framework.97 The framework, which was introduced in 
November 2017, includes the promotion of affordable and secure internet access as 
well as support in ensuring the necessary regulatory reforms.98 Broadly this is framed as 
a means of contributing towards the achievement of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals – for example by boosting job productivity and creation or by 
empowering women and girls. Additionally, the framework refers to digital 
technologies specifically as a means of “enhancing democratic governance and 
transparency”.99 In sum, by addressing the digital divide in its development polices, 
the EU contributes to reducing obstacles to access – thus promoting internet freedom. 
Consequently, the mainstreaming of digital aspects into existing approaches to 
development can be seen as an element of the EU’s wider commitment to promoting 
internet freedom.  
 
                                                 
92 Damro, Gstöhl & Schunz, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
93 European Commission, “Digital4Development: mainstreaming digital technologies and 
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The No Disconnect Strategy (and its mystery disappearance)  
 
The EU’s most notable attempt to move towards a more strategic foreign policy in the 
promotion of internet freedom came with the launch of the No Disconnect Strategy 
(NDS) in December 2011. Conceived by the Vice-President of the Commission 
responsible for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, the strategy originally came as a 
direct response to the disruptions to internet freedom caused during the Arab 
uprisings, but its scope later expanded beyond the Southern neighbourhood. The NDS 
intended to “support and assist human rights defenders, civil society organizations and 
individual citizens against arbitrary disruptions to the Internet and other electronic 
communication technologies” as well as against “indiscriminate surveillance in 
authoritarian regimes”.100 The strategy proposed action in four different ways:101 first, 
by developing and providing technological tools to enhance online privacy and 
security of people living in non-democratic regimes;102 second, by educating and 
raising awareness of activists about the risks involved with online communications;103 
third, by gathering high quality intelligence about the situation ‘on the ground’; and 
finally by developing co-operation mechanisms for the stakeholders involved to 
promote multilateral action and build cross-regional co-operation to protect human 
rights.104 
 
One of the key components of the NDS, which relates to the third point of action, was 
the development of a ‘European Capability of Situational Awareness’ (ECSA) 
platform, intended to map out network disruptions, human rights violations and 
restrictions of fundamental freedoms in connection with the digital environment. The 
ECSA would comprise both what is happening regarding network connectivity and 
traffic, alterations or restrictions, and what is happening on the ground in terms of 
human rights, media, legal and policy developments concerning the internet.105 It was 
envisaged that the ECSA would enhance EU decision-making capabilities with instant 
and reliable information.106   
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Despite the commitment made in the 2014 Guidelines to build upon the NDS, by 2016 
it was clear that the Strategy was suffering from a lack of ownership and that the 
programme had failed to take off due to a lack of co-ordination between the various 
units involved.107  Many elements of the strategy are still in place: as the following 
sections will demonstrate, the EU maintains a strategy of multi-stakeholder co-
operation and has established policies and initiatives which provide assistance and 
tools to activists. However, despite the publication of a feasibility study for the ECSA in 
2015, no further developments have emerged on the matter. An interview with a 
Commission official at DG CONNECT confirmed that the initiative appears to have 
been abandoned.108 Interviews with officials at DG CONNECT and DG DEVCO 
revealed that many elements of the NDS are still in operation, but there is no now clear 
ownership for the strategy.109  
 
Support for EU Delegations: Media4Democracy 
 
The EU is currently developing a programme to provide technical assistance to EU 
Delegations in the implementation of the EU’s commitments to freedom of expression 
online and offline as outlined in the 2014 Guidelines. Media4Democracy, which was 
established in January 2017 under the EIDHR by the European Commission’s DG 
DEVCO, received a sum of €4.36 million in order to facilitate its activities.110 The team 
has so far worked with thirteen different EU Delegations by providing training and 
capacity building to the Delegation staff, as well as supporting media landscape 
assessments and project design.111 Although Media4Democracy supports a range of 
topics addressed in the 2014 Guidelines, online media and ICT (including internet 
governance, digital security and data protection issues) are listed amongst the priority 
areas. The programme is still very much in a nascent stage, and many of the 
participating Delegations are attempting to identify entry points into the complex 
digital media landscapes.112 
 
                                                 
107 C. Stupp, “EU internet freedom programme endangered by Commission muddle”, 
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108 Interview with a DG CONNECT official, via email, 25 March 2019. 
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110 Center for International Media Assistance, “Donor Profile: European Commission”, n.d.  
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Support for online media, journalists and civil society activists 
 
Perhaps one of the strongest areas of EU external engagement in the promotion and 
protection of internet freedom is the promotion of online freedom of expression 
through the provision of direct support for civil society. Through various funding 
mechanisms and initiatives co-ordinated by DG NEAR, DG DEVCO and the EED, the 
EU is able to support established media outlets as well as so-called ‘citizen journalists’, 
including bloggers, social media activists and online human rights defenders.113 EU 
support for specifically online freedom of expression can be difficult to trace due to 
the fact that the EU’s policies and programmes do not generally make a clear 
distinction between support for online and offline media. However, EU mechanisms for 
civil society support have been adapting over time in order to cater for the increasing 
relevance of online journalism and activism, as well as the growing need to support 
digital human rights defenders.  
 
The EU’s most important funding instrument for supporting and protecting civil society 
activists is the EIDHR. The EIDHR, which was granted a budget of €2,332.75 million for 
the period of 2014-2020 supports civil society organisations and human rights 
defenders based on calls for proposals.114 The EIDHR’s commitment to supporting 
online freedom of expression is reflected in the fact that one of the specific objectives 
named in the 2018 global call for proposals was to “support civic activism and 
participation by leveraging digital technologies”.115  
 
Given that improvements in surveillance technology have increased governments’ 
abilities to monitor and track online activists, the EU’s work in supporting human rights 
defenders forms an important part of the EU’s efforts to protect digital rights. Around 
20-25% of the EIDHR implementation budget for 2014-2020 is dedicated to the support 
of human rights defenders.116 Much of the financial support is provided in small, ad 
hoc grants of up to €10,000 per grant for human rights defenders in need of urgent 
support.117 To complement the grant mechanism, ProtectDefenders.eu was set up in 
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2015 in order to provide a more comprehensive direct support mechanism for human 
rights defenders.118 The initiative is implemented by a consortium of twelve 
international organisations who provide around the clock urgent support as well as a 
range of medium- and longer-term measures.119 These measures include trainings on 
digital security for online activists as well as temporary relocation and support for 
judicial procedures.120 
 
Within the context of enlargement countries, online media does not form the focal 
point of the programme to build support for media freedom and media integrity in 
candidate countries for accession.  However, within DG NEAR some elements of the 
IPA-funded initiatives include a specific focus on supporting online local and 
alternative media as a means of furthering diversity of media content.121  For example, 
an Eastern Partnership Civil Society Hackathon in Minsk in June 2018 demonstrated a 
pro-active approach towards the role of ICTs in empowering civil society.122 
 
The EED was established in 2013 to provide an added-value to the existing support 
mechanisms and enables a more flexible mechanism for democracy support than is 
currently offered under programmes run by the EU institutions.123 The main recipients 
of EED support are in the European neighbourhood − Eastern Partnership countries, the 
Middle East and North Africa and, as of 2018, the Western Balkans. 124  In contrast to 
the EIDHR, the EED operates a demand-driven funding mechanism which allows civil 
society organisations, pro-democracy social movements or emerging individuals 
activists to make direct applications without open calls for grants. Sums offered by the 
EED can be more flexible or even much smaller than under the EIDHR, making them 
more manageable for small organisations or individual activists.  
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Almost half of the EED’s initiatives in 2018 related to media, civic activism and 
participation.125 Amongst these initiatives, there is a clear importance attached to 
support for online journalism and activism.126 Particularly in the case of restrictive or 
repressive media environments, online news sources, blogs, social networks and 
secure messenger services have provided new public discussion fora and have 
offered a way to circumvent the media bias of state-sponsored television, radio or 
printed press.127 The EED also has a history of providing funding for independent media 
organisations and attempts to contribute towards the development of more 
sustainable funding sources. 128 In political contexts where sponsorship and advertising 
can be harder to come by, the EED has been able to fill the funding gap and even 
provides funding support to activists and journalists working in exile. The EED has also 
funded more unconventional online initiatives – such as cartoonists who break political 
and social taboos, podcasters who revive storytelling traditions, environmental 
bloggers or filmmakers who engage with their audiences through satire.129 The effect 
of these bottom-up efforts is a diversification of available content, which contributes 
in a small but valuable way to the increase of internet freedom.   
 
Addressing issues of cybersecurity and disinformation  
 
The EU’s 2016 Global Strategy recognises that internal and external security have 
become “ever more intertwined”.130 The same logic can also be applied to the 
question of internet freedom: we see an environment in which internal concerns 
related to the rise of so-called ‘hybrid threats’ have a significant external dimension.131 
The term hybrid threat is used to describe a range of ‘non-conventional’ threats which 
include cyber-attacks or disinformation campaigns.132 In order to combat the dangers 
caused by hybrid threats the EU has proposed a range of new measures spanning 22 
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different action areas.133 These include the creation of an EU Hybrid Fusion Cell to 
gather information and intelligence as well as strengthened cybersecurity measures 
through the creation of an EU Rapid Response Force under the EU’s Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO).134  
 
Following the logic that EU internal and external security concerns are increasingly 
intertwined, it can be argued that the motive of the EU to tackle disinformation and 
promote a greater media diversity in its Eastern neighbourhood centres as much 
around internal security concerns as it does about broader concern for the state of 
human rights and democracy in the region. The European Council recognised the 
threat of Russian disinformation campaigns in March 2015 and has since developed a 
number of measures, including a comprehensive multi-million euro Action Plan against 
Disinformation in order address the issue.135 The EU considers the threat of Russian 
disinformation and election interference to be a danger for both EU member states 
and countries in the European neighbourhood.136  
 
A key element of the EU’s response to Russian disinformation in the Eastern 
neighbourhood is the East StratCom Task Force. Set up by the European External 
Action Service in 2015, the Task Force has three main objectives: it aims to explain and 
promote EU policies towards the Eastern neighbourhood, strengthen the overall media 
environment in the region and improve the EU’s capacity to forecast, address and 
respond to disinformation.137 The East StratCom Task Force is an area of clear strategic 
priority for the EU, with the 2018 budget of €1.1 million scaled up nearly fivefold to €5 
million for 2019.138 Until now the focus of external action against disinformation has 
been on the Eastern neighbourhood. However, the ‘Action Plan against 
Disinformation’ also recognises the threat posed to the Southern neighbourhood, 
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Middle East and Africa – which could imply a future expansion of the EU’s external 
engagement in this domain.139   
 
Export controls for surveillance technologies 
 
When considering the EU’s promotion and protection of internet freedom in its external 
action, it is also important to consider the policy incoherence that arises from flaws in 
the EU’s export controls for surveillance technologies. Given its legal and political 
commitments to promote and protect human rights, the EU and its member states 
face a responsibility to ensure that exports of surveillance technologies do not end up 
in the hands of governments who may use the technologies as an aid to commit 
abuses of fundamental rights. This responsibility became one of acute reality in 2011 
when it was revealed that EU-based companies had supplied surveillance 
technologies which were used by governments to commit human rights violations 
during the Arab uprisings. It was reported that companies in Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy had developed 
surveillance technologies used in Iran, Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia.140 News stories with 
headlines implicating European companies in cases of torture created intense 
pressure on the EU to establish greater control over its exports of ‘spyware’.141 
 
Currently, the export of ICT surveillance systems is still regulated by the 2009 Dual-Use 
Regulation.142 It established a common set of export control rules and criteria, as well 
as a specific set of control measures to be introduced by exporters. The regulation also 
provided for a network of authorities to support the exchange of information and a 
consistent implementation and enforcement of controls throughout the EU. The 
common EU list of dual-use items is regularly updated in order to reflect the list agreed 
at international level by the Wassenaar Arrangement. The EU can also adopt country-
specific sanctions, as was done in 2011 when the EU sanctions on Iran and Syria were 
updated to include surveillance technologies.143 
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Leading the Parliament’s movement for reform of the EU’s export regulation, Marietje 
Schaake submitted over one hundred amendments to the European Commission’s 
proposed extension of the existing export regulation.144 With many of her amendments 
taken on board, the Commission’s proposal was approved with a majority of 91% by 
the European Parliament in January 2019, but has been blocked by a group of nine 
member states.145 The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy and 
Poland have all joined a coalition led by Sweden in standing against the proposed 
update.146 The coalition’s opposition to the Commission’s proposal is justified by the 
reasoning that tighter export control “could seriously undermine the competitiveness 
of the EU-based industry”.147 This line of argument rejects the idea of the EU following 
an autonomous approach, instead viewing a harmonisation of export controls on the 
international level – for example in the context of the Wassenaar Arrangement – as a 
prerequisite for further EU controls.  
 
Diplomatic engagement at a bilateral and multilateral level 
 
At a bilateral level, the EU has a record of using public statements and démarches to 
condemn threats and violations of internet freedom, in particular making calls for 
greater protection of journalists’ rights.148 The EU also regularly addresses human rights 
concerns relating to the digital environment in its bilateral human rights dialogues, 
although very little is publicly known about the specific content of the conversations.149 
The effectiveness of these bilateral measures is certainly questionable: without 
tangible leverage, the EU stands little opportunity of changing the fundamental 
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approach of important global players, such as China or Russia, towards issues of 
internet freedom. The European Parliament’s Digital Freedom Strategy has argued in 
favour of trade and association agreements being conditional on the respect for 
digital freedoms.150 However, as can be seen with the insertion of human rights clauses 
into trade agreements more generally, application tends to be inconsistent and where 
actions have not matched up to its rhetoric, the EU risks appearing hypocritical.151 
Furthermore, the EU’s relative decline in economic and geopolitical importance does 
not put the EU in a position where it can use trade conditionality as a means to coerce 
rising powers such as China or Russia to alter their visions of internet sovereignty. 
 
The EU also has limited opportunity on the multilateral level for shaping the norms and 
visions of large and powerful digitally authoritarian states. Instead, the EU views the 
multilateral setting of the annual Internet Governance Forum as an opportunity to 
reaffirm its commitment to the multi-stakeholder model and foster cooperation 
between like-minded states. Emmanuel Macron’s 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security 
in Cyberspace (hereinafter referred to as the Paris Call) reaffirms many of the EU’s 
existing commitments to internet freedom – including the support for an “open, secure, 
stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace”, as well as restating the fact that offline 
rights must also be protected online.152 It also makes a plea for increased co-operation 
on cybersecurity and on tackling cybercrime – including an implied reference to the 
need to strengthen the Budapest Convention.153 Despite receiving hundreds of 
signatories, including 64 states and many leading technology companies, the US, 
Russia, China, Israel and Iran have all refused to sign.154 Whilst it essentially commits the 
signatories to nothing more than an intent to take future action, the Paris Call is also 
unlikely to result in fundamental changes without the agreement of the world’s 
important players. 
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EU external engagement: an assessment  
 
The emergence of external engagement in the promotion and protection of internet 
freedom, driven by internal security concerns, serves both as an opportunity and a 
concern for the future of the EU’s approach. On the one hand, the blurred line 
between internal and external concerns over hybrid threats, cybersecurity and the 
spread of online disinformation has brought greater attention and funding to issues of 
internet freedom in the European neighbourhood and beyond. On the other hand, 
there is a risk that internal security concerns could begin to draw funding or attention 
away from longer-standing instruments and organisations (such as the EIDHR or EED) 
which have an explicit democracy and human rights focus. It is still currently unclear 
how exactly internet freedom-related funding will be shared out under the Multiannual 
Financial Framework for 2021-2027. However, the proposal for a Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), which channels 
external action support for a wide range of policy areas into one single instrument, has 
raised questions about the future of EIDHR-funded projects.155 
 
Although the EU has succeeded at ensuring the inclusion of elements of internet 
freedom promotion into a variety of different policy areas, its broad approach suffers 
from a number of limitations. For example, the EU institutions have struggled to 
maintain strong leadership or guidance for the promotion and protection of internet 
freedom. The No Disconnect Strategy was a valiant attempt at establishing a more 
strategic approach to internet freedom. The strategy provided leadership to shape 
policies for civil society support, multilateral engagement and situational awareness. 
Although the EU has continued to deliver considerable infrastructural and civil society 
support, the lack of strategic leadership following the disappearance of the NDS was 
to the detriment of the establishment of an ECSA. The EU’s focus on situational 
awareness has moved on to the measurement and tracking of hybrid threats under 
the intelligence and information gathering services of the Hybrid Fusion Cell. Whilst the 
decision to channel funding into situational awareness for hybrid threats is a fully 
justified move, the loss of the possibility to build an ECSA to track network disruptions, 
human rights violations and restrictions of fundamental freedoms in connection with 
the digital environment could be something that the EU and its member states come 
to regret. As was seen in the case of the Media4Democracy project which supports 
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EU Delegations in delivering on the 2014 Guidelines, the number one challenge faced 
by the Delegations was a lack of contextual knowledge. This suggests that the revival 
of plans for an ECSA – possibly as an integrated function of the already established 
Hybrid Fusion Cell – could offer benefits for the EU’s wider democracy and human 
rights promotion.   
 
In addition to the lack of strategic direction, the EU’s approach to the promotion of 
internet freedom continues to be undermined by the EU’s failure to adopt and 
effectively implement more stringent export controls for surveillance technologies. 
Where the adoption of internal internet freedom-related policies are the result of 
intense intergovernmental and interinstitutional bargain, the European Commission 
and the European Parliament, who both promote progressive agendas for the 
external promotion of internet freedom, rely on the co-operation of the member states 
to adopt progressive legislation.   
 
Similarly, EU citizens rely on EU decision-making procedures of the EU to adopt 
legislation which continues to protect their basic digital rights. Amidst criticism over the 
recent Copyright Directive and the forthcoming regulation preventing the 
dissemination of terrorist content online, the EU must be sure to maintain its own high 
standards of internet freedom in order to preserve its external image as an upholder 
of digital rights.156   
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has analysed the EU’s external engagement in the promotion and 
protection of internet freedom, revealing that despite limitations arising from its 
opportunity and capability to act, the EU has managed to establish a considerable 
level of external engagement.  Within the last ten years, the promotion and protection 
of internet freedom has developed into an important area of external action, with 
engagement extending into a broad range of policy areas, including human rights 
and democracy promotion, digital policy, enlargement and neighbourhood policy, 
international development and trade. EU external action addresses internet freedom 
with regard to each of the three categories of ‘obstacles to access’, ‘limits on content’ 
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and ‘violations of user rights’. However, questions of user rights and content limitations 
have attracted most EU attention and funding. User rights are covered under relatively 
robust internal policies which have developed significant external dimensions. 
Protection of user rights also forms the basis of support for human rights defenders 
delivered under the EIDHR and through the EED. The goal of combatting content 
limitations forms the basis of the EU’s action against disinformation as well as its support 
for independent media and civil society activists.    
 
Many of the obstacles faced by the EU in the promotion of digital rights and internet 
freedom resemble challenges faced in the promotion of human rights and 
democracy more generally. Global internet freedom is shaped by the geopolitical 
environment in which it operates. This environment is very difficult for the EU to 
influence, especially outside of its neighbourhood where its political leverage is 
weaker. As with the field of migration, where human rights concerns are being played 
off against internal security concerns, there is a risk that the promotion of internet 
freedom will suffer as a result of the redirection of funding towards the management 
of hybrid threats. However, the EU’s new focus on combatting disinformation could 
provide benefits for the promotion of internet freedom. If framed correctly, new 
measures to increase media diversity in the European neighbourhood could result in 
greater internet freedom and present new opportunities for managing the 
intersectionality between cybersecurity and internet freedom – one that has 
frequently been co-opted by digitally authoritarian states as a pretence to instigate 
oppressive surveillance measures. 
 
The next years will bring both challenges and opportunities for the promotion and 
protection of internet freedom. Whilst a continuation of rising digital authoritarianism is 
likely to further increase demand for EU civil society support, the EU also has new 
challenges to face. The Trump administration’s refusal to sign the Paris Call, decision to 
scrap net neutrality and lack of interest in the US Internet Freedom Program has for 
now lost the EU an important geopolitical ally in the promotion of internet freedom.157 
The introduction of 5G networks – whether installed by the Chinese technology giant 
Huawei or not – will bring new challenges and complexities to data and 
communications privacy but will also provide an opportunity for the EU to confirm its 
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role as a leader in the protection of digital rights. The course of the EU’s next years of 
internet freedom promotion will be, in part, determined by the ability of the EU to 
establish greater coherence between its wide range of areas of engagement. By 
fostering a new drive for internet freedom from within DG CONNECT, the EU could gain 
back some of the leadership and necessary ambition that was lost upon the retirement 
of Neelie Kroes from her role as European Commissioner. 
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